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Introduction
Have you ever wondered whether Bruce Springsteen makes any
money when "Born in the USA"1 plays over the sound system at your
favorite restaurant? Depending on the sound system, he might. In fact,
"performing rights royalties-the money songwriter's and music pub-
lishers earn from [the] licensing of their works-constitute the largest
single source of their incomes." 2 Naturally, composers are interested
in protecting their music from unauthorized uses without proper com-
pensation, because "through these royalties ... song writing can be a
vocation, rather than an avocation."
3
The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act,4 has been introduced into
Congress under various titles and on several occasions.5 In October
1993, Representatives Thomas and Pastor introduced a bill entitled
the "Public Accommodations Exception Act of 1993. ",6 In September
1994, and again in February 1995, essentially the same bill, renamed
"The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act," was introduced into the
House.7 In the Senate "The Licensing Reform Act of 1996" was intro-
duced on March 15, 1996 by Senator Hatch8 and a bill entitled "Music
Licensing Legislation" introduced on March 20,. 1996 by Senator
Brown quickly followed.9 Finally, Congressman Sensenbrenner intro-
1. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the USA, on BORN IN THE USA (Sony Music
1984).
2. Music Licensing Practices of Performing Rights Societies: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 103d Cong. 25 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Hearings] (statement of Morton Gould,
President Emeritus, ASCAP). Morton Gould passed away in February 1996 at the age of
82. Friends and Fans Salute Morton Gould, ASCAP PLAYBACK, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 1.
3. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 25.
4. H.R. 789, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 28, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter collectively
the Fairness Act].
5. See, e.g., H.R. 3288, 103rd Cong. (1993); H.R. 4936, 103rd Cong. (1994); H.R. 789,
104th Cong. (1995); S. 1137, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1996); S. 1628, 105th
Cong. (1996); H.R. 789, supra note 4; S. 28, supra note 4.
6. H.R. 3288, supra note 5.
7. H.R. 789, supra note 5.
8. S. 1619, supra note 5. This most recent version of music licensing legislation differs
only in that it directs the Register of Copyrights to establish regulations governing both
sides of this issue and to further define an exemption currently found in section 110(5) of
the 1976 Copyright Act. 142 CONG. REC. S2192 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Hatch).
9. S. 1628, supra note 5. Senators Thomas, Faircloth, Thurmond and Helms joined
Senator Brown in introducing this legislation. 142 CONG. REC. S2293 (daily ed. Mar. 20,
1996) (statement of Sen. Brown).
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duced "The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act" for the second time in
the House while Senator Thurmond introduced its counterpart in the
Senate." Although bearing different names, each bill threatens essen-
tially every composer's ability to earn an income.
The Fairness Act, a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act of
1976,11 recommends several changes. Its most significant provision in-
cludes a copyright fee exemption for businesses playing radios or
televisions in their establishments.12 This proposed exemption is ac-
tually a modification of an exemption in existence within the 1976
Act. 3 However, the seemingly subtle changes that the Fairness Act
proposes would broaden the current exemption so as to exclude vir-
tually every restaurant, convention center and retail store from having
to pay performing rights royalties.14 This would have a devastating ef-
fect on the music industry.
15
This article discusses the 1976 Copyright Act and analyzes the ef-
fect of the Fairness Act on the future of the music industry if it passes
into law. Part I examines the background of copyright law. Part II de-
scribes the industry and the players involved in the introduction of the
Fairness Act in Congress. Part III describes the rationale behind the
Fairness Act and its impact on the parties involved. Part IV analyzes
the arguments both for and against the Fairness Act. Part V addresses
some alternate solutions to this dispute. I conclude that the Fairness
Act unreasonably exempts a large group of copyright users from pay-
10. H.R. 789, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 28, 105th Cong. (1997).
11. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-121 (1994) [hereinafter 1976 Act].
12. See H.R. 789, supra note 4, § 2. One proposed change would permit arbitration
during the licensing process for rate disputes involving performing rights licensing organi-
zations. Id. § 4. Another change would provide unlimited computer access to all of a reper-
toire (including the addresses and phone numbers of artists at no charge). A third change
would offer radio broadcasters "a per programming period license to perform nondramatic
musical works" in lieu of a blanket license agreement. Id. For a discussion of blanket li-
censing, See infra Part I.B.
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994).
14. See H.R. 789, supra note 10.
15. For example, this "would directly cost ASCAP's songwriters and publishers well
over $10 million annually." Memorandum from William F. Thomas, Assistant Director,
Public Affairs, ASCAP, to ASCAP Members (Aug. 8, 1994) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Thomas Memorandum]. ASCAP is the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers and is one of only three organizations which collects performing
rights royalties. The other two organizations are Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and the
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers ("SESAC"). ASCAP PLAYBACK,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 3.
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ing licensing fees, thus undermining the protection of copyrighted
works the 1976 Act was designed to protect.
I
The History of Copyright Law in the United States
A. Statutory Copyright Law Prior to the 1976 Copyright Act
Congress enacted the first copyright statute in the United States
in 1790.16 This statute protected against the unauthorized copying of
charts, maps and books. 17 The 1790 act offered no protection for the
public performance of a copyright owner's work.18 Non-dramatic
public performance, which was primarily sheet music during this time
period, gained protection under a 1831 amendment to the Copyright
Act.19 This amendment, however, did not protect the copyright
owner's rights against unauthorized dramatic public performance,
such as theatrical productions. 
20
The first protection afforded copyright owners against unauthor-
ized dramatic public performance of their works came over 100 years
later with an amendment to the 1790 Copyright Act.21 This protection,
however, did not extend to the performance of musical works. As a re-
sult, the copyright owner remained unprotected against unauthorized
public performance of musical works for profit under the 1897
amendment.
22
A breakthrough in copyright protection occurred just 12 years
later with the 1909 Copyright Act.23 This version established the ele-
ments necessary to invoke protection against unauthorized perform-
ance of copyrighted musical works. Under the 1909 Act, the copy-
righted material in question must be performed in public for profit.
24
16. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). The source of copyright protec-
tion is found in the U.S. Constitution which grants Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. See Copyright Act of 1790.
18. Id.
19. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
20. Id..
21. Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
22. Id.
23. Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 Act].
24. Id. § 1(e) (emphasis added).
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For example, singing in the shower would meet only one of the three
elements-performance. 25 The 1909 Act did not define the elements,
leaving that responsibility to the Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the 1909 Copyright Act
1. The Supreme Court Defines "For Profit" Under the 1909 Copyright Act
The Supreme Court first interpreted the 1909 Act in a 1917 deci-
sion, Herbert v. Shanley Co.26 In Herbert, Victor Herbert sued a res-
taurant for the unauthorized use of one of his compositions.27 In 1915,
John Philip Sousa brought a similar action against the Vanderbilt Ho-
tel on the same grounds.2 The Supreme Court combined these two
cases and established the "for profit" definition.
29
Both of the defendants in these two cases-the restaurant and the
hotel-argued that their use of the artist's compositions was not "for
profit" because they did not charge their customers for listening to the
music.30 The majority opinion, authored by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, reasoned that showing a direct charge to the customer is not
required. Instead it was sufficient to show that the music was used in
the process of making a profit.3' Justice Holmes concluded that "[i]f
music did not pay it would be given up." 32 Therefore, by refusing to
adopt the defendant's argument of requiring a direct charge in order
to meet the "for profit" definition, the Herbert opinion broadly de-
fined "for profit" in favor of composers. This definition of "for profit"
has remained untouched by Congress and the Supreme Court to the
present day.
25. There is no profit derived from singing in the shower and most people shower
alone. Therefore, singing in the shower would not be an unauthorized public performance
under the 1909 Act.
26. 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
27. Id.
28. John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co., 221 F. 229 (2d Cir. 1915).
29. Herbert, 242 U.S. at 591.
30. Id. at 594.
31. Id. at 594-95. Justice Holmes reasoned that when the public dines out, they not
only pay for the food, but for the surroundings as well. Holmes further reasoned that the
Court's decision would not have a big impact on restaurants because the cost of paying
copyright fees would be passed on to the general public. Id.
32. Id.
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2. The Supreme Court Defines "Public Performance" Under the 1909
Copyright Act
Beginning in 1931, the Supreme Court considered the definition
of "public performance" in several different contexts. In Buck v.
Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., the Court first considered whether a hotel
proprietor broadcasting a radio signal over loudspeakers to both pri-
vate and public rooms constituted a public performance. 33 The Court
unanimously held that this activity did indeed constitute a public per-
formance under the 1909 Act.
34
The defendant in Jewell-LaSalle set forth three arguments. First,
the defendant argued that the 1909 Act did not extend protection for
merely receiving a radio broadcast.35 The Court, however, rejected
this contention and interpreted the language of the 1909 Act in favor
of protecting composers by holding that, although radio transmission
and reception had not been contemplated at the time the 1909 Act was
written, this was not a bar to the plaintiff's claim. 36 Second, the defen-
dant argued that both the'radio station and the hotel could not be si-
multaneously performing the same work because "there can be but
one actual performance .... 31 Since the 1909 Act is silent on this is-
sue, the Court could have found for the defendant, but instead de-
cided that finding more than one defendant liable for a performance
was possible and that nothing in the 1909 Act directly supported the
defendant's argument.
38
Finally, the defendant argued that it did not have control over
what music it would receive from the radio broadcast and, therefore,
could not have intended infringement of the copyrighted work.39 The
Court could have held that the defendants would not be on notice that
they were infringing unless they know ahead of time what music was
being broadcast and whether or not it was copyrighted. However, the
Court held that commercial entities tuning into the radio should as-
sume the risk of such unpredictability. 40 The Court also held that it
33. 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
34. Id. at 202.
35. Id. at 195-96.
36. Id. See also Bernard Korman & Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music
and Performing Rights Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y USA 4 (1986).
37. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 197.
38. Id. at 198.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 198-99.
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was immaterial whether the hotel proprietor knew what would be
broadcast ahead of time.41
The Supreme Court did not consider the "public performance"
definition again until 1968 in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, Inc.,42
where the Court contemplated whether retransmissions of copy-
righted material over cable television systems constituted a "public
performance. " 43 The Court held that the cable systems retransmis-
sions were not public performances under the 1909 Act.44 This holding
appeared to directly conflict with Jewell-LaSalle, where the hotel's re-
transmission of a radio signal was held to be a public performance.45
The Court in Fortnightly reasoned that cable systems were actually
viewers,46 not broadcasters, 47 and that there could be no performance
by a viewer.48 However, the Court was not unanimous in this interpre-
tation of "public performance." In dissent, Justice Fortas criticized the
majority opinion by pointing out that the 1909 Act was so outdated it
was impossible for the Court to reason that cable television systems
should be exempt based on the intent of the 1909 Act.4 9 Justice Fortas
analogized that "[a]pplying the normal jurisprudential tools-the
words of the Act, legislative history, and precedent-to the facts of the
case is like trying to repair a television set with a mallet."50
Finally, the Supreme Court all but overturned Jewell-LaSalle
when it considered Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.51 At issue
in Aiken was the rebroadcast of a radio signal over loudspeakers.
52
The Court held that this was not a public performance despite its ear-
lier ruling in Jewell-LaSalle.53 The only difference between Jewell-
41. Id. at 198.
42. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
43. Id. at 398.
44. Id. at 402.
45. Jewell-LaSalle, 283 U.S. at 202.
46. 392 U.S. at 399.
47. The Court held that broadcasting constituted performance under the 1909 Act. Id.
48. Id. The Court reaffirmed the Fortnightly decision-that there could be no per-
formance by a viewer-and added that distant and local cable retransmissions are included
in its decision. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., 425 U.S. 394,406 (1974).
49. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 403 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. 422 U.S. 151 (1975). The Court confined Jewell-LaSalle to its facts. Aiken, 422
U.S. at 160.
52. Id. at 152.
53. Id. at 164.
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LaSalle and Aiken is that the radio station transmission rebroadcast in
Aiken was via a licensed radio station while the radio station in Jewell-
LaSalle was not licensed.54 Although the Court relied on the license in
Aiken to distinguish the two cases, licensing was never discussed in
Jewell-LaSalle.55 Additionally, whether a radio station holds a license
is not mentioned anywhere in the 1909 Act as a determining factor for
establishing "public performance."
56
3. The 1976 Copyright Act Overrules the Supreme Court's Interpretation of
the 1909 Copyright Act
Congressional response to Fortnightly and Aiken came in the
1976 Copyright Act, which overturned both of these decisions. 57 The
1976 Act definition of "public performance" includes the transmission
of a work "to the public, by means of any device or process, whether
the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same or in separate places and at the same
time or at different times."58 The accompanying House Report explic-
itly included within the scope of a "public performance" any "cable
television system ... when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscrib-
ers," and any "broadcasting network.., when it transmits" a perform-
ance, as well as any "local broadcaster ... when it transmits the net-
work broadcast." 59 This language clearly shows Congress' intent to
overturn Fortnightly and Aiken.
60
54. Licensing here refers to an agreement between the radio station and the composer
which licenses the station to use the works of the composer in exchange for a fee. Today,
these agreements are usually administered by one of the music licensing organizations-
ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC. Considering that in 1931 there was only one music licensing or-
ganization, ASCAP, that had been in existence since 1914, and considering that only
broadcast stations and no network stations were licensed, whether or not a radio station is
licensed is a tenuous argument at best. Copyright owners, however, have always been able
to license themselves without relying on a collective organization. Practically, however, this
is difficult for the copyright owner to administer. See Discussion of Blanket Licensing infra
Part II.B.
55. Aiken, 442 U.S. at 160-61.
56. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). See also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5676-77.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
59. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5676-77; S.
REP. No. 94-473 at 59-60 (1975).
60. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 36.
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C. Defining and Interpreting Section 110 of the 1976 Copyright Act-the
"Homestyle Exemption"
The 1976 Act exempts a number of performances, displays, and
communications from the category of public performance. 61 Specifi-
cally, section 110(5) of the 1976 Act exempts broadcasts transmitted
over "a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes." 62 This exemption applies primarily to small businesses but
not to businesses that charge their customers to hear the broadcast.63
Music licensing organizations typically bring infringement actions
on behalf of musicians-the copyright owners. However, musicians
are not the only copyright owners interested in protecting their works.
For example, the National Football League has brought numerous ac-
tions against restaurants and bars for broadcasting copyrighted pro-
grams without first obtaining a license.64 Restaurants and taverns are
not the only businesses capable of copyright infringement; any estab-
lishment playing copyrighted music without a license subjects itself to
an infringement action.65 The homestyle exemption still operates re-
gardless of the identity of the plaintiffs and defendants.
The courts have not easily determined what constitutes transmis-
sion equipment "of a kind commonly used in private homes." 66 As a
result, the homestyle exemption is "the subject of more litigation than
any other limitation on a copyright owner's rights." 67 And, in an at-
tempt to fashion uniform criteria to define the homestyle exemption,
different jurisdictions have looked to one another for guidance.
When interpreting the homestyle exemption, courts focus on the
equipment used in the establishment. In Edison Bros. Stores v. Broad-
61. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1994) [hereinafter the homestyle exemption].
62. Id. § 110(5). For example, turning on a radio and playing it in a commercial busi-
ness open to the public fits this definition. The Fairness Act focuses on this provision. H.R.
789, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 28, 105th Cong. (1997).
63. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 at 87.
64. See, e.g., National Football League v. Rondor, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. Ohio
1993); National Football League v. McBee & Bruno's, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
65. See Springsteen v. Plaza Roller Dome, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 1113 (M.D.N.C. 1985)
(action against miniature golf course); Rodgers v. Eighty Four Lumber Co., 617 F. Supp.
1021 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (action against store); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Jeep Sales & Serv.
Co., 747 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Va. 1990) (action against auto dealer).
66. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1994). See generally Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music,
Inc., 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992);
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982).
67. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 2.
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cast Music Inc.,68 the Eighth Circuit limited the scope of "a single re-
ceiving apparatus" 69 "to 'the area where a single work is per-
formed.' 70 This interpretation prohibits aggregating stores within a
chain for the purpose of disqualifying one or more stores in the chain
from the homestyle exemption. In other words, the court treats each
store operating within a chain separately to determine whether the
exemption requirements are satisfied.
Edison Bros. also addresses whether the square footage of the
store has any effect on qualifying for the homestyle exemption. The
court found that "the statutory language does not say or even imply
that the size.., of the establishment has a bearing on eligibility for the
homestyle exemption," 71 although some circuits do take the size of es-
tablishment into consideration.72
To determine if a restaurant qualified for the homestyle exemp-
tion, one district court considered the type and quality of the sound
system equipment used.73 Other courts have looked to the number of
speakers used, their power, and their location relative to the compo-
nent.74 For example, a Montana District Court relied on the fact that
the sound system in question included recessed ceiling speakers and
was used as part of a public address system.75 The Seventh Circuit de-
termined that a sound system including nine speakers does not qualify
for the homestyle exemption.76 Courts may consider other factors in
deciding if the homestyle exemption applies. These factors include the
distance between the speakers, the size and nature of the establish-
ment, augmentation of the rebroadcast system, financial capability of
the store, and concealment of the equipment.77
68. 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir. 1992).
69. 17 U.S.C. §110(5) (1994).
70. Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1422 (quoting Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Bou-
tiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1490 (7th Cir. 1991)).
71. Id. at 1425.
72. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir.
1991); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1982).
, 73. See Crabshaw Music v. K-Bob's of El Paso, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 763, 767 (W.D. Tex.
1990).
74. See, e.g., Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (D. Mont.
1990); Cass County Music Co. v. Muedini, 55 F.3d 263,268 (7th Cir. 1995).
75. Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1038.
76. Cass County Music Co., 55 F.3d at 268. The court also considered the size and
power of the speakers, the use of concealed wiring, and the fact that the sound system used
transformers capable of further enhancing the system. Id.
77. See Cass County Music, 55 F.3d at 263; Edison Bros., 954 F.2d at 1419; Claire's
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II
The Music Licensing Practices of Performing Rights
Organizations
In order to avoid copyright infringement, the user of copyrighted
material must pay a fee and seek a license from the copyright owner to
use the material in question. To promote efficiency, music licensing
organizations license users and collect fees on behalf of thousands of
composers.7" In the music industry, the music licensing organizations
who routinely monitor the collection of licensing fees are commonly
referred to as the "music police."79
A. How Music Licensing Works
There are three music licensing organizations, also known as per-
forming rights organizations ("PROs"): ASCAP, 0 BMI,s1 and
SESAC.8 2 ASCAP and BMI are non-profit organizations while
SESAC is privately owned. Each organization, protects composers
under essentially the same licensing process.
First, the composer grants one of the three PROs "the nonexclu-
sive right to license non-dramatic public performances of his works,
reserving to himself the nonexclusive right to license users."8 3 In other
words, the composer grants to one of the performing rights entities the
right to license the composer's works, or catalogue, on the composer's
behalf.8 4 Working on behalf of the composer, the PRO then collects
Boutiques, 949 F.2d at 1482; United States Shoe, 678 F.2d at 816; Hickory Grove Music, 749
F. Supp. at 1031; Crabshaw Music, 744 F. Supp. at 763.
78. Licensing fees are also referred to as performing rights royalties.
79. Peter O. Keegan, "Music Police" Step Up Monitoring of Royalties, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 13, 1993, at 89; James Barron, Paying the Piper: NY "Music
Cop" Prowls the City, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 22, 1993 (Sunday Punch), at 2; David O'Reilly,
Beware the "Music Police," PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 18, 1986, at C1.
80. ASCAP was created in 1914 and boasts over 55,000 members within its ranks.
ASCAP is operated by composers and artists. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 27
(statement of Morton Gould).
81. BMI is operated by the broadcasting industry and represents approximately
150,000 songwriters, composers and publishers. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 78.
82. SESAC was founded in 1930 and currently represents some 2,500 writers and
publishers. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 94, 96.
83. See Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 36, at 67.
84. A composer will grant to a PRO the rights to all of his or her individual songs.
Each song subsequently written will be added to the catalogue of songs that the PRO will
administer on behalf of the composer. This is similar to an individual granting power of
attorney which gives that attorney the right to negotiate on the individual's behalf on a
19971
copyright fees from the copyright users.85 Although the composer
grants the performing rights society this right to collect fees, the com-
poser still retains the right to individually license his or her own works
to other users and collect the respective fees associated with those in-
dividually licensed works.
86
Individual licensing would not be practical in most situations. In
the restaurant industry, for example, it is far too cumbersome for a
restaurant manager to make individual licensing agreements for every
song is played over loudspeakers within the restaurant during a one
year period. Also, licenses must be obtained prior to using copy-
righted material. Copyrighted musical works are property; 87 and
playing a musical work without a license is equivalent to using some-
one's property without permission.
A restaurant manager has no way of predicting which songs will
be played over the loudspeakers on any given day, let alone during
any given year, especially if that manager uses the radio. Even if the
manager could anticipate which songs would be played, the amount of
work involved in negotiating licenses would be so expensive that no
restaurant could afford to play many songs, if any at all.
B. Blanket Licensing as's Mechanism for Collecting Performing Rights
Royalties
Out of necessity, blanket licensing was created to solve the inher-
ent problems of securing licenses prior to using copyrighted music.88
PROs "grant licenses... permitting the use of the music of all the so-
ciety's members" thus alleviating the need for each restaurant to seek
licenses from individual performers. 89 For example, when a restaurant
obtains a blanket license from ASCAP, that restaurant can play any
songs within any of ASCAP's catalogues of music. ASCAP has over
55,000 members and BMI represents over 150,000 songwriters, com-
posers and publishers; a blanket license from each organization thus
allows the licensee to access millions of copyrighted musical works.
90
specific issue. See 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 96.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 14
(4th ed. 1993).
88. Maralee Buttery, Blanket Licensing: A Proposal for the Protection and Encour-
agement of Artistic Endeavor, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1245 (1983).
89. Id. at 1246.
90. COUNCIL OF BETTER BUSINESS BUREAUS, INC., PUB No. 24-276, MUSIC IN THE
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In a 1979 case, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems, Inc., CBS argued that blanket licensing essentially amounted
to industry price fixing.91 The Supreme Court held in favor of BMI,
reasoning that "in the face of available alternatives including direct
negotiation with individual copyright owners, the blanket license has
provided an acceptable mechanism for at least a large part of the mar-
ket for the performing rights to copyrighted musical compositions. 92
Therefore, blanket licensing can not be automatically held a per se
violation of the price fixing provision of the Sherman Act.93 Despite
the possible restriction of free trade, the Court could not ignore the
lack of a viable alternative to blanket licensing.
In CBS, the Court exercises a great deal of discretion in favor of
the performing rights organization.94 However, ASCAP and BMI's li-
censing activities are not without restrictions. ASCAP is controlled by
a finalized consent decree, the "Amended Final Judgment" ("AFJ").
95
BMI's activities are similarly restricted; however, BMI voluntarily en-
tered a consent decree without first being sued.96 The ASCAP decree,
entered into in 1950, has three requirements governing music licensing
practices. 97 First, under the AFJ, ASCAP must grant a license to every
user requesting a license so long as that user agrees to pay a reason-
able licensing fee. 98 Second, ASCAP may not discriminate against
similarly situated users. 99 Third, if the user cannot agree on a licensing
fee with ASCAP, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York will determine the fee based upon all of the
available evidence.10° There are two differences between the BMI and
ASCAP decrees: the BMI decree does not specify (1) that BMI may
MARKETPLACE-WHO PAYS THE PIPER: WORKING WITH MUSIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS 2-3 (1992) [hereinafter MUSIC PAMPHLET].
91. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) [hereinafter
CBS]. On its face, blanket licensing comes dangerously close to violating the anticompeti-
tive provision of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
92. CBS, 441 U.S. at 2.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 1950-1951 Trade Cases P 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
96. United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cases P 71,941 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
97. 1950-1951 Trade Cases P 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
98. Id. at 63,752.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 63,754.
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only obtain nonexclusive rights from its affiliates, or (2) that the Dis-
trict Court may set the fee if the parties are unable to agree.
10 1
III
The Evolution of The Fairness Act
Litigation against performing rights entities has been relatively
unsuccessful for individual businesses. 10 2 In particular, restaurant
owners have battled for years to find a way to avoid paying licensing
fees.103 Bob Rice of the Oregon Restaurant Association admits that "a
lot of people, me included, have fought the battle and lost." 1°4 Busi-
nesses seeking exemption from licensing fees have found little sympa-
thy in the courts, because the homestyle exemption does not apply to
many businesses.
1°5
When the courts fail, the only viable alternative is to change the
law. On February 23 and 24, 1994, and again on July 17, 1997, the Sub-
committee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary held "oversight
hearings on music licensing practices of the performing rights socie-
ties." 10 6 Representative William J. Hughes, Chairman of the Sub-
committee, began the 1994 Hearings by recognizing that the Sub-
committee sought to evaluate "whether the copyright law has kept
pace" with the changes in the mugic licensing industry since the 1976
Act.10 7 Nevertheless, the homestyle exemption was the focus of the
hearings.
108
101. CBS, 441 U.S. at 12 n.20.
102. Steven Blinn, Director of Media Relations for BMI, was quoted as saying: "BMI
files about 400 lawsuits a year, with about 75 percent to 80 percent settled out of court."
Keegan, supra note 79, at 89.
103. See, e.g., Patty Shillington, Licensing Group Sues Marathon Resort over Tunes,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 28, 1984, at 1D; O'Reilly, supra note 79; Barron, supra note 79;
Jesse Hamlin, Some Sad Songs on this Jukebox, S.F. CHRON., May 5, 1992, at D2.
104. AllKeyed Up, RESTAURANT BUSINESS, Oct. 10, 1993, at 73.
105. See supra Part I.C.
106. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1; Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and
Other Establishments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Admin. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 25 (1997) [hereinafter 1997
Hearings].
107. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 1 (opening statement of Chairman Huges).
108. Id.
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A. Subcommittee Hearings-the "Homestyle Exemption"
The 1994 subcommittee hearings were held prior to the introduc-
tion of the Fairness Act into Congress, but after the introduction of
H.R. 3288 (the Public Accommodations Exceptions Act). t °9
The main goal of both the 1994 and 1997 hearings was to look at
the homestyle exemption of the 1976 Act as addressed in the Fairness
Act and H.R. 3288.110 Since all versions of the proposed legislation
suggest the same modification to the copyright law, both hearings re-
flect the arguments for and against the Fairness Act.11'
Proponents of the new legislation to amend the 1976 Act believe
that the current homestyle exemption is too difficult to interpret." 2 In
contrast, the Ninth Circuit has held "that a person of ordinary intelli-
gence can understand and apply the requirements of the Act" when
analyzing the homestyle exemption. 1 3 Interestingly, the Supreme
Court has not addressed the interpretation of the homestyle exemp-
tion.
14
At the 1994 hearings, Representatives Pastor"
5 and Thomas H6
spoke in support of H.R. 3288. The legislation received additional
support from Guy Greg, a New Jersey restaurant owner, 117 represent-
ing the National Restaurant Association ("NRA"). The music licens-
ing organizations' major opposition was evidenced by statements from
its top officials: President Emeritus Morton Gould for ASCAP;
118
Vice President Marvin Berenson of BMI; and President and CEO
Vincent Candilora of SESAC.119 This high level of representation was
also found at the 1997 hearings. NRA represented by its General
Counsel, Peter Kilgore, 120 again supported the legislation. Additional
109. H.R. 3288, 103rd Cong. (1993).
110. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2; 1997 Hearings, supra note 103.
111. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2; 1997 Hearings, supra note 103.
112. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 3, 5, 14, 115, 125.
113. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. United States Shoe Corp., 678 F.2d 816, 817 (9th Cir.
1982).
114. See, e.g., Edison Bros. Stores v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 954 F.2d 1419 (8th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc.,
949 F.2d 1482 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992).
115. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 3.
116. Id. at 14.
117. Id. at 136.
118. Id. at 20.
119. Id. at 110.
120. 1997 Hearings, supra note 102.
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statements opposing the legislation were offered by Wayland Holy-
field, President of Nashville Song Writers' Association Interna-
tional,' 21 representing ASCAP; Mac Davis, a songwriter, representing
BMI;122 and Pat Collins, Senior Vice President of Licensing at
SESAC.123 These are just a few of the persons called before the Sub-
committee at each of the hearings.
124
Although the sources of information varied, the arguments re-
garding the Fairness Act were essentially the same. ASCAP, BMI, and
SESAC effectively argued against implementation of the Fairness Act
while the NRA, the representative of the industry most affected by
this legislation, argued in favor of the Fairness Act.
125
B. The Impact of this Legislation on the Music Industry and the Supporters
of the Fairness Act
Currently, legislation to extend copyright terms from life-plus-50
years to life-plus-70 years is being blocked pending the passage of the
Fairness Act.126 Also, passage of the Fairness Act would cause the
United States to violate some International treaties, including TRIPS
and the Berne Convention.127
The Fairness Act would be disastrous to PROs as well as artists.
The implementation of the Fairness Act would cost the music industry
millions of dollars annually.128 In addition, there would be significant
damage to the protection of copyrighted works. This legislation could
open the door for all businesses earning profits from copyrighted mu-
sical works to seek similar exemptions.
For example, this exemption could encourage online service pro-




124. Some of the other organizations represented at the hearings and offering state-
ments included: the American Choral Directors Association ("ACDA"), the American
Society of Association Executives ("ASAE"), the National Licensed Beverage Associa-
tion, the International Association of Auditorium Managers, the Consumer Electronics
Manufacturers Association, and the National Religious Broadcasters Music License
Committee. Id.
125. Id.; 1994 Hearings, supra note 2.
126. See, e.g., Bill Holland, Bills on the Hill, BILLBOARD, June 1, 1996, at 43; Amy
Zuber, Music Licensing Reformers Try New Arrangement, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS,
May 19, 1997, at 10.
127. U.S. Music Licensing Challenged, Bus. LAW EUROPE, June 7, 1997.
128. See Thomas Memorandum, supra note 15.
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without paying licensing fees. Online service providers could argue
that because they charge a monthly fee and not a separate fee for the
use of the copyrighted material and the material could be construed as
incidental to an online service provider's profits, they should also be
exempt. As Nancy S. Clarke, Executive Director for The American
Music Center, points out, the government has criticized artists for be-
ing too dependent on government support while simultaneously intro-
ducing the Fairness Act which "threatens to severely limit [artists']
ability to survive in a market economy."'
129
Proponents of this legislation have much to gain from the enact-
ment of the Fairness Act. First, they will be freed from paying annual
licensing fees for playing the radio in their establishments. Also, the
legislation calls for allowing disputes over licensing fees to be settled
through arbitration. 30 Currently, all disputes must be brought to a
special court in New York which hears all licensing disputes around
the country.131 This is very expensive for small businesses to pursue;
arbitration would provide an easier, more practical avenue to dispute
licensing fees. PROs use this advantage to their benefit.132 It allows
them to set the prices, leaving as the retail business owner's only al-
ternative to sue in New York-an option that is too expensive to be
practical.
IV
The Arguments for and Against the Implementation of the
Fairness Act
Supporters of the Fairness Act have nine essential arguments in
favor of amending the 1976 Act. Restaurants are not the only industry
supporting the Fairness Act. However, they are the most vocal of its
supporters. Other businesses that do not fit within the homestyle ex-
emption, such as the convention industry, dance instructors, consumer
electronics manufacturers, and religious broadcasters, also support the
Fairness Act.
133
129. Nancy S. Clarke, Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1995, at All.
130. See H.R. 789, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997). See also S. 28, 105th Cong. § 3 (1997).
131. 1950-1951 Trade Cases, P62, 595, at 63,754 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
132. Bob Dart, Fight to Change Songwriter Royalty System Grows Louder, PALM
BEACH POST, Apr. 9, 1997, at 3D.
133. See, e.g., 1994 Hearings, supra note 2; 1997 Hearings, supra note 106.
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A. Arguments for and Against the Current Licensing Fee Structure
Pursuant to the 1976 Copyright Act
1. Whether Artists Receive Double Royalties for a Singular Performance-the
"Double-Dipping" Argument
First, supporters of the Fairness Act argue that when they pay
performing rights royalties for playing radio or television broadcasts,
the artist receiving those royalties is "double dipping." 134 This argu-
ment is based on the fact that the artist is already earning royalties for
the song being broadcast.' 35 PROs collect performance rights royalties
from both radio and television stations for performance or broadcast
of music over the airways. Fairness Act supporters argue that the
composer should not be compensated twice for a singular perform-
ance (e.g. first for the performance over the radio or television and
then for the rebroadcast or performance in the restaurant or other re-
tail establishment). 36 Also, Fairness Act supporters point out that the
general public is not charged for rebroadcasting the radio and televi-
sion in their homes and cars and, therefore, neither should retail busi-
nesses.
137
According to the PROs, the National Restaurant Association is
incorrect-artists are not "double dipping." The NRA's argument ig-
nores the fact that each use of the song is separate and unrelated. It is
clear that both the broadcaster and the restaurant are "receiving a
separate and distinct benefit for his or her performance of the mu-
sic." 138 the situation is similar to a movie theater selling multiple tick-
ets to a single showing of a movie. Each patron pays for his or her
separate use of the movie. To suggest that because one patron has
paid to see the movie, all other patrons should be exempt is ludicrous.
The same is true with the music licensing exemptions requested in the
Fairness Act.
134. See 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 136.
135. Radio and television stations have separate licensing agreements and pay per-
forming rights royalties to ASCAP and BMI for their use of copyrighted music. See id. at
24-37, 78-90.
136. This argument is similar to the defendant's argument in Jewell-LaSalle that "there
can be but one actual performance," an argument that the Court did not adopt. 283 U.S. at
197-98.
137. Bill Holland, Restaurant Fee Battle Continues at House, Senate, BILLBOARD, May
18, 1996, at 8, 87.
138. See 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 275.
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Additionally, the licensing agreements used for radio and televi-
sion are completely different than those used with restaurants and
cover unrelated types of public performance. Licensing agreements
between PROs and broadcasters contain an exemption for
"performances which take place through the reception of programs by
users who entertain their patrons with those receptions."' 39 Essen-
tially, broadcasters "do not pay fees for the separate performances,"
thus eliminating collection or "double dipping."'140 In other words,
when licensing with radio and television stations, the PROs take into
account the fact that restaurants pay licensing fees for the use of radio
and television broadcasts within their establishments.
2. Whether Deriving a Direct Profit from Performing Music Should Affect
the Collection of Licensing Fees-the Direct Profit Argument
A second argument in support of the proposed legislation is based
on the premise that the businesses do not charge patrons separately
for musical broadcasts. 141 For example, restaurant owners make their
profit from direct sales of food; there is no separate charge on the
menu for the music playing over the loudspeakers. The NRA con-
cedes that "[it is a different matter if an operator advertises this mu-
sic to attract customers. That would fall under the definition of using
music for direct profit, and should be handled differently."' 4 2 Some es-
tablishments- do charge separately for admission based on musical en-
tertainment. These establishments are normally charged a higher rate
for licensing fees based upon this direct charge to the customer. The
NRA does not dispute license fees paid when there is a direct charge
for entertainment by tavern owners. 143 This argument focuses on di-
rect profits from the playing of music, which is contrary to the current
definition of "for profit" under the 1976 Act.144
Part of this argument is based on the premise that both radio and
television are broadcast and received for free by the general public.
Supporters of the Fairness Act believe that they are being singled out
to pay licensing fees for the rebroadcast of radio and television signals
when the rest of the world can tune in for free. It is also argued that in
139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. This argument is specifically addressed at the Subcommittee Hearings by Joe
Johnson who represents the National Licensed Beverage Association. Id. at 115.
142. Id. at 137.
143. See id. at 135.
144. See supra Part I.B.1.
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the future this could lead to charging the general public for receiving
radio and television broadcasts.
145
The PROs argue that when one dines out, the cost of the meal
includes more than simply the cost of the food. All of the restaurant's
costs are included in the cost of the meal, from the flowers on the ta-
ble and the linen tablecloths to the paintings hanging on the wall.
14 6
Although the profit may not be direct, playing a television or radio in
any place of business can be tied to profits in the atmosphere that it
creates. Just as the linen tablecloths and the paintings on the wall cre-
ate ambiance, so does the music over the loudspeakers, and each piece
of property ought to be purchased as each contributes to the restau-
rant's profits.
Since rebroadcasts that occur in the home fall within the exemp-
tion requirements of the 1976 Copyright Act the general public would
not be charged. When an individual rebroadcasts the radio or televi-
sion in their home, for example, this rebroadcast meets the definition
of the homestyle exemption.
1 47
3. Whether Rebroadcasting Radio and/or Television signals is Incidental to a
Business' Profits-the Incidental Argument
The NRA asserts a third argument that most customers do not
come to a bar because the television or radio is playing.1 48 This argu-
ment is commonly referred to as the "incidental" argument. It pro-
poses that an exemption to the 1976 Act is justified where the restau-
rant's use of the copyrighted musical work is merely "incidental" to
the restaurant's business. The argument relies on the premise that
background music contributes to a restaurant's bottom line in the
same manner as placing flowers on the table or using linen tablecloths.
PROs argue that table linens and flowers could also be consid-
ered "incidental" to a restaurant's business and that restaurants must
pay for flowers and linens. The same should be true with respect to
paying licensing fees for copyrighted music. As Justice Holmes
pointed out in Herbert, the purpose of dining out is to eat "in sur-
roundings that to people having limited powers of conversation or
145. See, e.g., Holland, supra note 137.
146. Beverly Keel, Making Their Voices Heard, NASHVILLE BANNER, Oct. 11, 1995, at
Dl; James Peterik, Letter to the Editor: Enjoying the Music? It's Mine, WALL ST. J., July
17, 1995, at All. But cf. Stanley Kyker, Playing Fair When the Music Plays, L.A. TIMES,
May 29, 1995 (Calendar), at 3.
147. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5). See supra Part I.C.
148. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 137.
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disliking the rival noise give a luxurious pleasure not to be had from
eating a silent meal."'
149
4. The Quantifiability of Profits Directly to Each Artist Receiving Licensing
Fees
Even if a business' profits could be attributed to playing music, a
fourth argument attacks the quantifiability of any such profits. 150
PROs use complicated mathematical equations to determine how to
compensate the artist. These formulas are not directly tied to how of-
ten the artist's songs are actually performed or rebroadcast by licen-
sees. 151 It would be possible to track the frequency of performance of
song titles as this is done with radio stations all across the country.
However, once a restaurant or other retail establishment purchases a
blanket license, that licensee does not report the song titles performed
or rebroadcast by the licensee. There is no need to track this informa-
tion because the licensee has access to all of the song titles within the
performing rights organization's repertoire. Because the frequency of
performance for song titles is not tracked, it is difficult to link profits
to individual artists. Therefore, blanket licensing does not accurately
compensate the artist; instead, blanket licensing under-compensates
some artists while overcompensating others. 152
The NRA, however, does not offer a viable solution to this di-
lemma of collecting fees on behalf of thousands of artists and fairly
distributing those royalties. Although difficult to quantify, the licensor
is adequately compensated, because there simply is no viable alterna-
tive and blanket licensing is the best solution.
5. The Practicality of the Per Program Licensing Fee-are Licensing Fees
Too Expensive?
Pursuant to the consent decrees, PROs must offer an alternative
to blanket licensing. 153 Licensees must have the option to negotiate li-
149. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 595 (1917).
150. See id.
151. The formulas are based on square footage of the establishment, room capacity,
type of performance-live or recorded-and the licensees' entertainment costs. Music
PAMPHLET, supra note 90, at 7.
152. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 124 (statement of Guy Gregg, Restaurant Owner),
137 (statement of Mike Leonard, Restaurant Owner).
153. 1950-1951 Trade Cases P 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc., 1966 Trade Cases P 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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censing fees either individually or on a per program basis.15 4 In other
words, instead of paying a licensing fee and receiving access to thou-
sands of songs, a licensee can pay for licenses to only those song titles
that are actually performed or rebroadcast. Supporters of the Fairness
Act argue that per program licensing fees are so expensive as to be an
impractical alternative to blanket licensing.
155
Supporters of the Fairness Act argue that they use only a fraction
of the thousands of song titles which they are currently licensed to
use.156 Essentially, licensees feel that they are paying for song titles
they never use. In order to license on a per program basis, lists of song
titles must be made available covering those song titles in each per-
forming rights organization's repertoire. In this way, the business
owner can choose those song titles which they will rebroadcast or per-
form in their business.
PROs argue that the per program license is more expensive than
blanket licensing because of the costs associated with administering
the program license. 5 7 Just like any retail business, buying package
deals, purchasing items in larger quantities, or buying certain items in
combinations is usually less expensive than buying the individual
items in the package or buying smaller quantities. For example, buy-
ing an extra value meal at McDonalds is less expensive than buying a
burger, french fries and drink individually.
PROs favor blanket licensing over per program licensing for
many reasons. First, blanket licensing is less expensive to adminis-
ter.158 When a business purchases a blanket license, it covers all songs
in the PROs repertoire and requires one license agreement, whereas,
if individual songs are licensed then multiple agreements may be nec-
essary. Also, most artists prefer to not be contacted by multiple busi-
nesses seeking to license individual songs. Artists can assign their
rights to PROs to handle all their licensing. This is much more cost ef-
fective, less time consuming and easier for the artist.
154. Id.
155. Bill Holland, House Bill Would Reduce Some Fees Paid to Rights Groups,
BILLBOARD, Apr. 23, 1994, at 6; Hagar Scher, Marilyn Bergman Goes to Bat for Songwrit-
ers, WORKING WOMAN, Sept. 1996, at 12.
156. Matt Sheehan, Sour Note; Restaurants Across New Jersey Don't Offer Music or
Television for a Day to Protest Music Licensing Fees, ASBURY PARK PRESS, July 16, 1997,
at B-4.
157. Broadcast Music, Inc. Government Relations Q & A (visited Sept. 13, 1997)
<http://www.bmi.com/legislation/legqna.html>.
158. Id.
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Under blanket licensing, fees are extremely inexpensive. For ex-
ample, a retail store with approximately 1500 square feet paid BMI
just $120 in 1992 for access to BMI's complete catalogue of music for
the entire year.1 59 Meanwhile, the annual licensing fee in 1992 "for a
restaurant that features live music, with a $35,000 annual entertain-
ment bill was $565. " 16° In addition, licensing fees can be passed on to
the customer.
1 61
6. Whether the Way in Which Licensing Fees are Formulated is an Arbitrary
Process
Supporters of the Fairness Act argue that there is no negotiation
involved in obtaining licenses; the fees are preset. Also, since PROs
do not give details regarding how licensing fees are determined, they
seem arbitrary.162 For example, when one restaurant owner asked for
an invoice from a performing rights organization representative, the
representative wrote a figure down on a napkin, handed it to the
owner and declared this was the invoice.1 63 The only details given are
that the PROs are governed by the consent decrees and that the size
and profits of the establishment are taken into consideration.
Meanwhile, licensees have to provide tax information to PROs to
use in calculating licensing fees. 164 Supporters of the Fairness Act
want to know how the formulas are being used to determine fees and
the rate classifications for each criteria. PROs do not reveal the actual
rate classifications.
The flaw in the argument that licensing fees are arbitrary is that
the PROs are governed by consent decrees which control fees.1
65
These consent decrees are a matter of public record. 166 It is no secret
that the criteria for establishing a licensing fee include such factors as
159. MusIc PAMPHLET, supra note 90, at 7.
160. Id.
161. See Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1917).
162. Dart, supra note 132.
163. Id.
164. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of John Deion, Restaurant Owner);
Holland, supra note 155.
165. United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 1950-
1951 Trade Cases P 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966
Trade Cases P 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
166. Id.
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profits, the size of the establishment seeking a license, and whether
the business has a separate charge for the music.
167
Moreover, PROs must treat each similarly situated business
seeking a license the same.1 68 In other words, two like businesses will
pay the same or similar licensing fee. There is no discretion afforded
to PROs; it.has been removed by the courts.
B. Arguments for and Against the Implementation of the Fairness Act
Which Relate to the Collection of Licensing Fees
1. Performing Rights Organizations' Representatives' Reputation of
Threatening and Coercive Tactics in Collecting Licensing Fees
Many restaurant owners, dance studios and other retail busi-
nesses complain that PROs use strong-arm tactics to bully them into
obtaining licenses.' 69 Currently, there is a movement to pass legisla-
tion in individual states in an effort to control the way in which PROs
approach and interact with businesses for licensing purposes. 170 Since
only Congress can change federal copyright law, this is the only sig-
nificant change that supporters of the Fairness Act can make on the
state level.
As of May 1997, twenty-two states had passed such legislation
while four states still have legislation pending.171 In each state where
legislation has passed or is pending, the PROs have attempted to ne-
gotiate with the supporters of such legislation to compromise on some
of the issues. In those states where negotiations broke down, the
PROs challenged the legislation arguing it violates or contradicts fed-
eral copyright law.172 For example, District Judge Barbara S. Jones
initially held New York's legislation violated the federal copyright
law. 173 However, the district court later dismissed the case. 174 The
167. MusIc PAMPHLET, supra note 90, at 6.
168. Id.
169. Amy Zuber, Florida, Alaska in Harmony, Pass Music-License Bills, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, July 15, 1996, at 1; Dart, supra note 132, at 3D; Marian Horosko,
Classroom Music License Fees: Why?, DANCE MAG., Apr. 1997, at 58; Holland, supra note
137, at 87.
170. See Zuber, supra note 169.
171. Id. Those states with legislation pending include Hawaii, Oregon, Rhode Island
and Vermont. Amy Zuber, Music-Licensing Reformers Try New Arrangement, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, May 19, 1997, at 259.
172. Cam Simpson, Committee OK's Bill to Regulate Music Cops, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Jan. 1, 1996, at C-01.
173.. ASCAP Hails Court Decision Declaring N. Y. State Law Unconstitutional, ASCAP
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New York law requires that PROs give businesses notice of inspec-
tions.175
Some states are seeking to control the way in which PRO repre-
sentatives approach licensees. The proposed legislation in many of the
states includes such measures as requiring them to state the purpose of
their visit, give a list of their repertoire to the licensee, give the licen-
see advance notice of their visit, and give advance notice of alleged
copyright violations as well as provide full disclosure of their rates.
176
PROs claim that they train their representatives to behave pro-
fessionally. 177 They are instructed to provide information to those un-
licensed businesses in violation of the federal copyright law and en-
courage those businesses to properly secure licenses. 178 However with
hundreds of field representatives across the country, it is impossible
for the PROs to police their every move.
Unfortunately, this is an adversarial situation from the beginning.
Restaurant owners and other small businesses naturally resist any
added costs to their businesses. When personalities get involved, tem-
pers can easily flare. This inherent friction makes the field represen-
tative's job that much more arduous.
2. Making Song Lists of Each PROs Repertoire Available to Retail
Businesses
Supporters of the Fairness Act argue that the PROs do not make
available to licensees the song titles in their respective repertoires.
179
Without the list, there is no way to know which artists and their songs
are aligned with which performing rights organization. Supporters of
the Fairness Act would like the opportunity to contact artists directly
in order to license songs without using the PROs. The Fairness Act
calls for making song titles as well as names and contact information
for artists available.
PLAYBACK, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 8.
174. News, NATION'S RESTAURANT NEWS, Sept. 9, 1996, at 62.
175. ASCAP Hails Court Decision Declaring N.Y State Law Unconstitutional, supra
note 173.
176. See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 172; Zuber, supra note 169; News Briefs, NATION'S
RESTAURANT NEWS, Aug. 19,1996, at 2.
177. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 22 (statement of Morton Gould).
178. Id. "We do not intimidate, we do not harass, we do not abuse." Id. at 76
(statement of Marvin L. Berenson, BMI).
179. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 125 (statement of John Deion); Horosko, supra
note 169, at 58.
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This would also facilitate per program licensing. By making song
titles available, licensees could pick ahead of time only those song ti-
tles they will use and license them individually instead of paying blan-
ket licensing fees and never rebroadcasting thousands of song titles
available to them. But, this information is voluminous. There are mil-
lions of songs that have been written over the decades. In the past,
such a request would have been impossible. However, with computers,
databases, CD-Rom, DVD and the Internet, it is feasible. BMI has
made its repertoire available on-line; others are sure to follow.
Making song lists available is not as difficult an issue, however, as
including contact information for individual artists. This raises ques-
tions of protecting the privacy of those artists who do not wish to be
contacted by small businesses from all across the country. For exam-
ple, big artists like Madonna, Michael Jackson, and Van Halen would
be inundated with individual licensing requests. If that information
were widely disseminated on the Internet, fans alone could make life
miserable for the artists.
3. The New York Rate Court's Jurisdiction Over Licensing Fee Rate Disputes
Currently, pursuant to the consent decrees, rate disputes over li-
censing fees can only be heard by one court in the United States-the
New York Rate Court.18' For PROs with offices in New York, this is
no more expensive than normal litigation. For small businesses across
the country, hiring New York counsel and traveling to New York to
bring such actions is extremely expensive.
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General civil litigation is not governed in this way. Most contro-
versies are settled locally through mediation, arbitration, and in local
district and superior courts. Supporters of the Fairness Act seek the
same treatment in order to make such litigation practical.
Arbitration, however, creates more problems than it solves. Fed-
eral copyright law is complicated, technical and subject to multiple in-
terpretations if not governed by a single source. It would be impossi-
ble to treat similarly situated businesses in a similar manner if judges
and arbitrators across the country were allowed to hear rate disputes,
especially as this is such an obscure area of the law. Judges across the
country would rarely hear such cases, would be completely unfamiliar
180. See United States v. American Soc'y of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 1950-
1951 Trade Cases P 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966
Trade Cases P 71,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
181. 1994 Hearings, supra note 2, at 128 (statement of John Deion); Holland, supra
note 137, at 87; Dart, supra note 132, at 3D.
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with this area of the law, and would be expected to rule quickly on
difficult, complicated issues. Having one court responsible for all rate
disputes ensures continuity that cannot otherwise be achieved.
V
Alternatives to Federal Copyright Legislation
A. Allow the Copyright Office to Develop These Issues
Legislation introduced by Senator Hatch suggested that these is-
sues be explored and. solved by the Copyright Office. 82 Naturally, the
Copyright Office interprets federal copyright law every day. It is more
familiar with the issues, the players, and which solutions are reason-
able. Thus, the Copyright Office may be better equipped than Con-
gress to handle such intricate legislative changes. 183 It may, in fact, be
dangerous to allow Congress to act in this area since some changes
which seem minor in scope could have a huge effect on small business
owners as well as the music industry.
The Copyright Office has spoken publicly regarding this legisla-
tion.1 84 It's official position supports the PROs and keeps current
copyright law as written.185 Naturally, supporters of the Fairness Act
vehemently oppose the Copyright Office taking charge of these is-
sues. 186 Allowing the Copyright Office to take over could be construed
as quite a victory for PROs.
B. Allow the Marketplace to Determine These Issues
1. Agreements Between the Performing Rights Organizations and Other
Industries Regarding the Collection of Licensing Fees
PROs negotiate agreements in other industries to establish licens-
ing fees and practices. For example, radio and television stations have
agreements with PROs regarding licensing fees. These agreements are
negotiated and compromises are given on both sides.
182. Bill Holland, Music Licensing Bill Introduced: "Fairness" Issues to C'right Office,
BILLBOARD, Mar. 30, 1996, at 10.
183. Id.
184. 1997 Hearings, supra note 107 (statement of The Honorable Marybeth Peters,
,Register of Copyrights).
185. Id.
186. Holland, supra note 137, at 146.
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Congress has encouraged both sides of these issues to reach
agreement. 187 This keeps Congress from having to tinker in an area of
law that is difficult to understand and effectively change without de-
stroying the rights of all parties involved. An agreement would protect
all involved.
In fact, the National Licensed Beverage Association struck an
agreement with the PROs.1 88 However, since the agreement did not
exempt all restaurants from paying licensing fees, the NRA would not
sign or support the agreement. 89 Thus, the battle continues.
2. New Businesses: Alternatives to Obtaining Licenses through the
Performing Rights Organizations
One musician, Tivadar Madl, unable to secure a recording con-
tract and tired of going unrecognized, came up with an interesting idea
to market his music and save small business owners licensing fees.'90
Madl and his business partner, Gyula Sziracky, market Madl's CDs di-
rectly to restaurants and other small retail stores at a slightly higher
price to include the performance right.191 Madl and Sziracky plan to
market CDs for other similarly situated musicians.
1 92
Although not a new business, Muzak provides music that includes
the license to rebroadcast without having to secure a license through
any of the PROs. It is widely known that Muzak has a separate
agreement with the PROs to cover those performance rights.
Another option for small businesses is to play music which does
not require licensing. For example, most classical music was written so
long ago that copyright protection has expired. Bach and Beethoven
can be played without violating federal copyright law.
C. New York Rate Court Regional Compromise as Proposed by the
Honorable Howard Coble
In the most recent hearings on changing federal copyright law,
Howard Coble made a suggestion regarding the New York Rate
Court-Judges could be sent from the rate court to hold court in dif-
187. Id.
188. NLBA Withdraws Support for H.R. 789/S. 1137, ASCAP PLAYBACK, Nov.-Dec.
1995, at 1.
189. See Holland, supra note 137, at 87; Zuber, supra note 132, at 1.
190. Leo Smith, Plan May Be Music to Restauranteurs' Ears, VENTURA COUNTY
REVIEW L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1997, at D-9C.
191. Id. The rate is approximately $20-$30 per CD.
192. Id.
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ferent regions of the country so that small businesses would not have
to travel all the way to New York to dispute rates. 19 3 Small business
owners might still have to travel, but only to a neighboring state. Legal
fees would also be less because local attorneys charging more reason-
able fees would become available.
VI
Conclusion
The 1976 Act has not remained static. It has changed over time,
when necessary, to expand protection of copyrighted material-not to
restrict that protection. If the Fairness Act is passed, it can only open
the door to relaxing licensing practices with respect to online services,
telephone companies and other entities entering the market as first
time copyright users. This is contrary to the goal of protecting copy-
righted works.
Supporters of the Fairness Act try to appeal to Congress with
their David and Goliath argument. Restaurant owners and other busi-
ness owners portray themselves as the "little guy," small business
owners up against the big PROs with all their muscle. Federal copy-
right law, however, actually protects songwriters, the littlest guys of
all. Typically, songwriters are not businesses with employees, but
rather individual artists who struggle to make a living. Many work day
jobs to support themselves. Often, performing rights royalties are the
only income they see from the music industry. The changes that sup-
porters of the Fairness Act propose jeopardize these individual artists'
ability to practice their craft.
We cannot reach out and touch music. It is not tangible, like
flowers or table linens. But this does not mean that music is not prop-
erty. Set against this backdrop, the Fairness Act is unfair because it is
not based on any logical theory which would justify that a business be
exempted from paying performing rights royalties-compensation for
using someone else's property.
... there being no property more peculiarly a man's own than that
which is procured by the labor of his mind.
Massachusetts Act of March 17, 1783.
193. 1997 Hearings, supra note 106 (statement of The Honorable Howard Coble,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property).
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